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The Five Indicia of Virtual Property
CHARLES BLAZER *
I. INTRODUCTION
Many Americans use “it” every day. Although it is intangible, it may
be worth thousands of dollars. Because we can both control it and prevent
other people from controlling it, we assume, without much thought, that we
own it. Sometimes we pay someone a monthly fee to hold it for us. Sometimes, simply by using it, we increase its value. When we finish using it,
we often sell it.
“It” is virtual property, and it may take the form of an email address, a
website, a bidding agent, a video game character, or any number of other
intangible, digital commodities. If it were to be damaged or stolen, the
immediate questions would be: (1) how should a court identify it; and (2)
what degree of legal protection should it receive?
Because no court or legislature in the United States yet has recognized
virtual property interests, a combination of contract and custom currently
controls the relationship between Internet users and service providers.
This legal status quo generally provides sufficient framework to structure
this relationship to the parties’ benefit. Thanks to services offered by
Internet businesses, users have access to valuable tools and resources that
they would not otherwise have; users may trust reputable service providers
not to sabotage the value of those tools and resources; and, despite ominous language in certain click-wrap agreements, service providers generally do not interfere with the secondary market for virtual property. 1
Therefore, unless a service provider recklessly or intentionally maligns a
user’s virtual property interests, the legal status quo should not be disturbed, as between a user and a service provider.
The legal status quo, however, poses a significant risk to users transacting in virtual property with other users, paradoxically in part due to the
efforts of service providers to ensure the quality of their services. Given
* J.D. candidate, 2007, Franklin Pierce Law Center. The author would like to thank Professor
Alice Briggs, Cynthia Mousseau, Patrick Muffo, Ross Hicks, Matt Polson, and the Pierce Law Review
staff for their helpful feedback, suggestions, and assistance.
1. Such interference generally only occurs when the activity of a minority of users threatens to
undermine core features of the service from which the majority of users (and the service provider)
derive value, as in the Blacksnow Interactive v. Mythic Entertainment example. See infra Part II.A.4
(discussing the Blacksnow case). Note that the Blacksnow case was dismissed by default, without an
opinion on the merits.
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the uncertain landscape of virtual property law, typical End User License
Agreements (EULAs) (between users and service providers) raise questions of unconscionability, notice, and consent, thereby undermining the
enforceability of users’ interests. 2 Those using eBay.com and other services to trade online user accounts face a labyrinth of legal uncertainty. If,
as suggested by the typical EULA, users have no property interest in their
accounts, then their trades may be void, e.g., for lack of consideration.
Despite this uncertainty, the secondary market value of virtual property is
undeniable. 3 People trade virtual property every day. 4 Users need legal
protection and certainty when dealing with other users in these trades.
Skeptical courts may be slow to accept the concept of virtual property,
preferring instead the comfort of preexisting legal doctrines. Several circuitous legal constructs can help litigants temporarily avoid the virtual
property question, but such resort will likely fail to serve the parties’ longterm interests. Potential alternative constructs include: licensor-licensee, 5
trespass to electronic chattels, 6 copyright infringement, 7 and trade secret
2. See, e.g., Zachary M. Harrison, Comment, Just Click Here: Article 2B’s Failure to Guarantee
Adequate Manifestation of Assent in Click-Wrap Contracts, 8 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 907, 938-42 (1998) (arguing that users accepting terms of common click-wrap agreements rarely
manifest a subjective intent to agree, thereby raising questions of effective consent and threatening the
ability to withdraw consent). But see ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1451-52 (7th Cir.
1996) (reciting practical advantages of the current market reality and affirming the enforceability of
click-wrap licenses). This note posits no opinion as to whether typical EULA terms are unconscionable. Rather, given the potential value of virtual property, the emotionally addictive nature of Massively Multiplayer Online Games (MMOGs), and the circumstances surrounding typical click-wrap
agreements, this note simply suggests that users are likely to explore the doctrine of unconscionability
as a means to attack EULA terms. See generally Kevin W. Grierson, Annotation, Enforceability of
“Clickwrap” or “Shrinkwrap” Agreements Common in Computer Software, Hardware, and Internet
Transactions, 106 A.L.R. 5TH 309 (2003) (collecting discussion and case law relating to software
licenses but not specifically pertaining to virtual property).
3. See generally Edward Castronova, Virtual Worlds: A First-Hand Account of Market and Society
on the Cyberian Frontier (CESifo Working Paper Series, Paper No. 618, 2001), http://ssrn.com/ abstract=294828 (documenting the secondary market for virtual characters and treasures in the MMOG
Everquest, developed by Verant Interactive).
4. Id.
5. See infra Part III.A (discussing how the relationship between a service provider and a user is
analogous to a licensor-licensee relationship, in the traditional property context).
6. See Steven Kam, Intel Corp. v. Hamidi: Trespass to Chattels and a Doctrine of Cyber-Nuisance,
19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 427, 427 (2004) (discussing the revival of trespass to chattels as a “pragmatic
answer to the problem of electronic invasions” and predicting the evolution of “cyber-nuisance” as an
independent cause of action, though not specifically addressing the type of virtual property discussed
herein); Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, Applicability of Common-Law Trespass Actions to Electronic
Communications, 107 A.L.R. 5TH 549 (2003) (collecting cases). But see Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Virtual
Property, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1047, 1081 (2005) (noting that the doctrine of trespass to chattels will often
fail to adequately resolve virtual property disputes “because it is possible to steal virtual property
without ever touching a chattel computer owned by the owner of the virtual property, or hacking a
server”).
7. See Greg S. Weber, The New Medium of Expression: Introducing Virtual Reality and Anticipating Copyright Issues, 12 COMPUTER/L.J. 175, 190-91 (1993) (“[Virtual Reality] insiders agree that with
this technology, the user becomes a cocreator of his or her experience”); see also Molly Stephens, Sales
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misappropriation. 8 Although each of these alternatives may be sufficient
to resolve limited cases, recognizing virtual property for what it is—a legitimate property interest inducing reasonable expectations of legal protection—would provide a more predictable and broadly applicable solution.
The question therefore becomes, how should courts identify protectable virtual property interests? Partially due to the dramatic success of
Massively Multiplayer Online Games (MMOGs) 9 and the rise of secondary markets for virtual characters and treasures from those games, 10 a
recent frenzy of legal scholarship has struggled to resolve this question. 11
This note supports the legal recognition of virtual property interests, as
already convincingly justified by the legal analogy to traditional property
interests set forth by Professor Joshua Fairfield, 12 buttressed by the practical reality that virtual property has significant economic value. 13
Building on these rationales, this note proposes five indicia, common
to most forms of virtual property, which a court should use to identify legally protectable virtual property interests on the Internet. These indicia
are: (1) rivalry; (2) persistence; (3) interconnectivity; (4) secondary markets; and (5) value-added-by-users. 14 This note cautions, however, against
applying this newfound definition indiscriminately against the interests of
of In-Game Assets: An Illustration of the Continuing Failure of Intellectual Property Law to Protect
Digital-Content Creators, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1513, 1528 (2002) (concluding that service providers generally cannot invoke copyright law to restrict secondary market sales).
8. See generally Alois Valerian Gross, Annotation, What Is Computer “Trade Secret” Under State
Law, 53 A.L.R. 4TH 1046 (1987) (collecting trade secret case law). For example, Gross’ annotation
arranges cases according to six factors relevant to determining trade secret status in particular circumstances: 1) extent to which information is known outside employer’s business; 2) extent of measures
taken by employer to guard secrecy of information; 3) value of information to employer and to his
competitors; 4) amount of effort or money expended by employer in developing information; 5) ease or
difficulty with which information can be properly acquired or duplicated by others; and 6) extent to
which information is known by employees and others involved in employer’s business. Id. Abstracted
beyond the realm of employer-employee relationships, these six factors vaguely relate to the virtual
property interests inherent in service provider-user relationships. Under the trade secret analogy, a
password required to access a user’s account is the “information” at issue. Misappropriation of such
“information” could cause financial damage, thereby incurring liability. Fully exploring the potential
analogy between trade secrets and virtual property, however, is a topic for another day. Moreover,
such a contortion of preexisting law would disserve jurisprudence by dodging the real issue—the property interests at stake.
9. See generally BRUCE WOODCOCK, AN ANALYSIS OF MMOG SUBSCRIPTION GROWTH –
VERSION 18.0, http://www.mmogchart.com/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2006) (tracking active subscriptions
to online game worlds).
10. See generally Castronova, supra note 3 (documenting the secondary market for virtual characters and treasures in the MMOG Everquest, developed by Verant Interactive).
11. See, e.g., Fairfield, supra note 6, at 1053 (advocating for legal recognition of virtual property).
12. See id. (analogizing virtual property to “real world” property).
13. See generally Castronova, supra note 3 (discussing the monetary value generated by individual
Everquest players and by Everquest, as a whole).
14. The first three indicia of virtual property (rivalry, persistence, and interconnectivity) were first
articulated by Professor Joshua Fairfield. Fairfield, supra note 6, at 1053-54. This note suggests that
secondary markets and value-added-by-user are equally significant indicia of virtual property.
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the very entities without whom the property would not exist: the businesses
hosting the remotely accessed computer resources (i.e., the service providers).
Professor Fairfield and other legal scholars already have illustrated the
compelling and well-reasoned legal analogy between virtual property and
traditional property. 15 Indeed, most virtual property is deliberately designed to behave like traditional property. 16 Thus, three of the five proposed indicia of virtual property derive directly from the analogy to traditional property. 17 Specifically, virtual property shares with traditional
property the characteristics of rivalry, persistence, and interconnectivity. 18
For example, a user’s email address is rivalrous because, by using the address, the user prevents other people from using it. The email address is
persistent because it continues to exist even when it is not being used.
Lastly, the email address is interconnected because it is part of a system
where people may interact with it according to certain rules. Real property, such as land, is likewise generally rivalrous, persistent, and interconnected. 19
This analogy, however, is not perfect. Whereas an interest in land or
chattels may be entirely acquired and assigned, 20 Internet users acquire and
access virtual property as a result of service providers’ initial and continuing investment in computer hardware, software, and intellectual property.
Thus, virtual property law must not only balance the interests of users
against the interests of other users; the law must also balance the interests
of users against the interests of service providers. 21
15. Id. at 1053; F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, The Laws of the Virtual Worlds, 92 CAL. L.
REV. 1, 49 (2004) (applying traditional property theories to justify the enforceability of virtual property
interests). The term “traditional property” is used herein, for lack of a better term, to encompass both
real and personal property, to the exclusion of intellectual property. Professor Fairfield uses the term
“real world property.” Fairfield, supra note 6, at 1053.
16. Fairfield, supra note 6, at 1053.
17. See infra Part I (discussing the characteristics of rivalry, persistence, and interconnectivity, as
well as other indicia of property interests).
18. Fairfield, supra note 6, at 1053-54.
19. Note that intellectual property arguably does not meet any of these criteria. The analogy between intellectual property and virtual property may be tempting, given that they are both intangible
property interests, but this is where the similarity ends.
20. Disregarding, for the moment, inalienable interests such as droit moral. See generally Timothy
E. Nielander, Reflections on a Gossamer Thread in the World Wide Web: Claims for Protection of the
Droit Moral Right of Integrity in Digitally Distributed Works of Authorship, 20 HASTINGS COMM. &
ENT. L.J. 59, 71 (1997) (defining the inalienable droit moral right of integrity and discussing its implications for copyright law in cyberspace, with examples of representative causes of action in the United
States and abroad).
21. Furthermore, while the analogy to traditional property may be instructive, it may underrate the
economic value and effect of virtual property. As summarized by Professor Fairfield, in 2005:
The projected U.S. revenue from sales of virtual objects in real-world currency is approximately $100 million dollars, and over $1.5 billion worth of transactions occurs yearly
through [virtual] trades. The secondary market in virtual items was recently estimated at
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Therefore, to supplement Fairfield’s indicia, the presence of secondary
markets and value-added-by-users may serve as additional indicia of a virtual property interest worthy of legal protection. These two indicia explicitly allow courts to weigh practical economic considerations in determining
the amount of protection to be accorded to a user’s virtual property interests, specifically in light of the legitimate interests of service providers.
Part II of this note describes each of these five indicia individually, with
examples.
Part III of this note applies the five indicia to the well-established
framework of traditional property to illustrate this balancing process.
Throughout the development of the law in this area, courts must retain the
freedom and flexibility to craft appropriate equitable remedies on a caseby-case basis, and special attention should be directed to the practical issues commonly faced by Internet service providers. The ultimate purpose
of virtual property jurisprudence should be to strike a balance that provides
legal redress to users whose legitimate virtual property interests have been
violated while simultaneously reducing liability and disincentives to service providers who promote and sustain the growth of the Internet.
II. IDENTIFYING VIRTUAL PROPERTY
Virtual property is persistent computer code stored on a remote source
system, where one or more persons are granted certain powers to control
the computer code, to the exclusion of all other people. 22 Similar to traditional property, virtual property is often rivalrous, persistent, and interconnected. 23 Virtual property often is traded in secondary markets, 24 and us-

over $880 million dollars, and is expanding quickly. [Norrath, one of several virtual worlds
in the MMOG Everquest,] had, as of 2002, a greater net worth than Bulgaria and a higher
GNP per capita than India or China. Likewise, the individual as well as the aggregate value
of the virtual property bought and sold is rising—a piece of virtual real estate within a virtual environment recently sold for approximately $30,000.
Fairfield, supra note 6, at 1062.
22. This is my own formulation of the definition of virtual property. Cf. id. at 1049-50 (defining
virtual property as computer code designed to act more like land or chattel than ideas). No United
States court or legislature has yet provided a controlling definition.
23. Id. at 1053. In his article, Professor Fairfield initially sets forth the relevance of rivalry, persistence, and interconnectivity. Id. at 1053-54. For the purposes of this note, Professor Fairfield’s choice
of relevant characteristics is accepted and expanded.
24. See also Castronova, supra note 3, at 18 (asserting that a virtual world is a real economy, from
an economist’s point of view, in part because the virtual assets may be exchanged with real world
money at a floating exchange rate).
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ers of virtual property often add value to the property just by using it. 25
Therefore, the five indicia of virtual property are:
1) Rivalry;
2) Persistence;
3) Interconnectivity;
4) Secondary Markets; and
5) Value-Added-by-Users.
This note borrows the indicia of rivalry, persistence, and interconnectivity from Professor Fairfield’s article. 26 These three indicia, in particular,
illustrate the parallel between traditional property and virtual property. 27
However, virtual property is intangible—similar to intellectual property. 28
A court wary of unduly contorting intellectual property law to accommodate the frontiers of virtual property may look to Fairfield’s analysis to
understand that, in fact, virtual property may fall safely within the bounds
of traditional property law without adversely affecting intellectual property
law. 29 To supplement Fairfield’s analysis and because of the significant
economic interests and potential claims to natural rights likely lurking in a
virtual property dispute, this note adds the latter two indicia (secondary
markets and value-added-by-users) as additional considerations for the
courts. 30
25. This characteristic has been loosely equated to co-authorship, in the copyright sense, or natural
rights, in the more general, property-theory sense. See Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 15, at 46-47
(discussing Lockean theories of property rights through labor as a supplemental justification for the
legal recognition of virtual property interests); Weber, supra note 7, at 190-91 (“[Virtual Reality]
insiders agree that with this technology, the user becomes a cocreator of his or her experience”); Andrew J. Wu, From Video Games to Artificial Intelligence: Assigning Copyright Ownership to Works
Generated by Increasingly Sophisticated Computer Programs, 25 AIPLA Q.J. 131, 175-76 (1997)
(noting that software programmers and users may be co-authors of works created using computer
programs).
26. Fairfield, supra note 6, at 1053-54.
27. Id.
28. See id. at 1064 (describing virtual property as “code that is intangible, but that has been coded to
act as if it were tangible”).
29. Id. at 1096; see generally Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital
Anticommons, 91 CAL. L. REV. 439, 446 (2003) (expressing the potential negative side effects of unduly contorting intellectual property law to create new intangible property interests in cyberspace).
Furthermore, this note explicitly distinguishes virtual property from intellectual property. See, e.g.,
infra Part II.A.2 (using the five indicia suggested herein to distinguish virtual property from intellectual
property).
30. See generally Castronova, supra note 3 (documenting the development of secondary markets
surrounding the MMOG Everquest, by Sony Online Entertainment); Julian Dibbell, The Unreal Estate
Boom, WIRED, Jan. 2003, available at http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.01/gaming.html (describing the time and money committed by MMOG players to increase the value of their user accounts); Posting of Edward Castronova to Terranova, http://terranova.blogs.com/terra_nova/2006/01/
how_a_gold_farm.html (Jan. 19, 2006) [hereinafter Castronova Posting] (describing a virtual treasure
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Altogether, the five indicia form a framework for identifying protectable virtual property. In the rapidly changing and unpredictable realm of
the Internet, however, no test should be absolute or overly rigid. The indicia should be considered as a totality, with the reasonable expectations of
ordinarily prudent consumers underpinning any analysis.
A. The Five Indicia of Virtual Property
1. Rivalry
Rivalry is the inherent characteristic of traditional property that limits
control of the property, at any given time, to one person. 31 Simply put, a
shoe can only be worn by one person at a time; thus, the shoe is rivalrous
personal property. Viewed another way, by wearing the shoe, the wearer
presently excludes all others from using it. Intangible rivalrous property,
such as an email address, is an example of virtual property. By appropriating an email address for personal use, the user excludes others from using
it.
Rivalry is the principal difference between virtual property and intellectual property. Intellectual property is not only intangible but also nonrivalrous. For example, by listening to a song stored in MP3 compression
format, the listener in no way affects the ability of others to listen to the
same song. Likewise, by affixing golden arches to a product as a trademark, the producer in no way affects the ability of others to use exactly the
same trademark. 32 Limitations on the use of intellectual property arise not
from rivalry, but from exclusionary rights enforceable at law. 33 Thus, the
simplest and most immediate method for distinguishing virtual property
from intellectual property is to determine whether the property in question
is actually rivalrous or merely protected by an exclusionary right.
Note, however, that rivalry alone does not give rise to virtual property
and that some forms of virtual property may be “semi-rivalrous.” For ex“farm” with sixteen employees, in the MMOG Everquest, which generated nearly $800,000 per year in
income).
31. Fairfield, supra note 6, at 1053.
32. Trademark exclusivity arises only through action of law in the interest of protecting consumers
from confusing or deceptive trade practices. See Artype, Inc. v. Zappulla, 228 F.2d 695, 696-97 (2d
Cir. 1956) (In the words of Judge Learned Hand, “[a] trade-mark is indeed often spoken of as a monopoly; but in fact it is only part of the protection of the owner’s business from diversion to others by
means of deceit.”). This is not rivalry in the physical sense. Rather, trademark exclusivity is a purely
legal construct.
33. See, e.g., Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 424 (1908) (affirming the
right to exclude provided by a patent, regardless of non-use by the patentee); see also Thomas W.
Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 730 (1998) (arguing that the legal
right to exclude others is the defining characteristic of all property).
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ample, many people may share simultaneous control of a remote database,
seemingly negating the characteristic of rivalry and suggesting that the
database is not a form of virtual property. Indeed, as public accessibility to
a virtual resource increases, the property protections accorded to individuals using the resource should correspondingly decrease. This rule reflects
the reasonable expectations of Internet users. Beyond individual contributions, no reasonable user expects to control the content of a public Internet
message board. Conversely, where access to a private chat room is tightly
controlled and limited to members of a small group, the group, as a single
entity, may begin to reasonably expect some level of virtual property protection. Thus, rivalry is neither dispositive nor absolute; it merely serves
as one of the five proposed indicia of protectable virtual property.
2. Persistence
Persistence is the inherent characteristic of traditional property that
maintains the property, generally unchanged, even when it is not being
used. 34 A parked car continues to exist, and, at the end of the day, the
owner reasonably expects to find the car where he parked it. Thus, like
most forms of tangible property, the car persists. Intangibles, however,
often lack persistence. For example, music persists only as long as the
sound continues to reach an ear. Music only becomes protectable intellectual property after it is “fixed in any tangible [i.e., persistent] medium of
expression,” such as an audio CD. 35 Yet the tangible and persistent audio
CD is not protectable intellectual property, per se. 36 The intangible music
is intellectual property, while the tangible audio CD remains personal
property. 37 Thus, intellectual property is correctly characterized as intangible and lacking persistence.
Conversely, virtual property, although intangible, is persistent. 38 A
greater degree of persistence warrants a greater property interest. For example, a user of remotely hosted email services, such as Yahoo! Mail, may
reasonably expect messages saved in an “Inbox” to persist for weeks or
months (until intentionally deleted) even though the email account is only
34. Fairfield, supra note 6, at 1054.
35. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
36. See id. § 101 (distinguishing “Sound recordings” (the music) from “Phonorecords” (the audio
CD)).
37. See id. (distinguishing “Sound recordings” (the music) from “Phonorecords” (the audio CD));
see also Fairfield, supra note 6, at 1096 (explicitly citing the difference between an audio CD and the
intellectual property contained therein as analogous to the difference between a virtual property interest
and the intellectual property which gave rise to that interest).
38. See Fairfield, supra note 6, at 1054 n.26 (attributing the persistence of most virtual property to
distributed computing).
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used for a few minutes each day. The persistent nature of an email account
induces reasonable reliance and increases the user’s property interest in the
account, thereby increasing the justification for equitable intervention by
courts to remedy third-party interferences with that interest. In contrast, a
low or minimal degree of persistence suggests that users’ virtual property
interests are weak and legally unprotectable. For example, despite the fact
that video arcade machines often memorialize the “Top 10 High Scores,”
no reasonable pizza parlor patron would expect a high score on a Frogger
machine to persist for any great length of time, given that the list resets
whenever the machine is unplugged. 39
3. Interconnectivity
Interconnectivity is the inherent characteristic of traditional property to
affect or to be affected by more than one person and by other property. 40
Like the other indicia of virtual property, interconnectivity is neither dispositive nor absolute, with varying degrees of interconnectivity suggesting
varying degrees of protectable user interests. Note that easier access does
not necessarily equate to greater interconnectivity. Rather, the legally protectable value of interconnectivity arises from a person’s ability to use
property to create or experience an effect. 41
For example, a free website that only allowed users to track stock
prices probably would not create viable virtual property interests in the
users’ accounts. If the accounts were tampered with or were to disappear
entirely, users would be upset, but the violation of legitimate property interests would be minimal, given that the accounts lacked any capacity to
directly affect other property. In contrast, a website that allowed users to
buy and sell stock may create strong virtual property interests in the users’
accounts. If these accounts were tampered with, users would feel rightfully furious and violated, and the consequent monetary damage could be
extraordinary. Only interconnectivity distinguishes the two examples.
Thus, Internet services that allow users to create or experience an effect,

39. The high score list of the Frogger machine lacks persistence largely because it is a single machine with a single point of failure. Distributed computing eliminates single points of failure, thereby
increasing persistence. Id. Thus, remotely accessed distributed computing systems may indicate persistence and secondarily indicate a virtual property interest. Not all data stored on distributed computing systems, however, is virtual property. Such data may lack other indicia of virtual property, as in the
case of a public data store with no form of access control, i.e., a lack of rivalry.
40. See id. at 1054 (noting that although one person may exclusively control a tangible object, the
object may affect other people and other property through the laws of physics).
41. See id. (“The value of a URL or an email address is . . . that other people can connect to it, and
can experience it.”).
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particularly services in e-commerce, demonstrate interconnectivity and
thereby suggest the presence of virtual property interests.
The above-described inherent characteristics of traditional property
thus may guide courts in identifying virtual property interests. Virtual
property disputes, however, are likely to involve unpredictable and technologically complex circumstances that will obscure analogies to strictly inherent characteristics such as rivalry, persistence, and interconnectivity.
Therefore, extrinsic characteristics, such as the behaviors of markets and
users, may legitimately supplement the definition of virtual property.
4. Secondary Markets
Courts should be particularly alert for possible virtual property interests when users develop secondary markets to trade access to and control
of remotely hosted computer code, regardless of whether a service provider
sanctions such trades. For example, businesses have recognized the potential value of certain virtual properties and therefore have developed business models based on trading such properties in secondary markets. 42 As a
matter of policy, where a free market cultivates value, courts should protect that value as long as other substantive rights are not infringed. Courts
should also avoid excessive “protection” which could strangle creativity
and do more harm than good. 43
As a famous example of a business based on a secondary market for
virtual property, in 2003 a company calling itself Blacksnow Interactive
paid workers in Mexico to play a MMOG (Dark Age of Camelot, by
Mythic Entertainment) full-time for the sole purpose of generating virtual
treasure to sell on eBay. 44 Presumably, Blacksnow paid Mexican workers
a low enough wage to generate a net profit on the secondary market sales.
In the interest of preserving “fair” play, Mythic ended Blacksnow’s practices by prohibiting game property transactions in secondary markets and
by banning users who participated in such transactions. 45 Blacksnow sued,
but it quickly developed other legal problems and disappeared. 46 Had the
lawsuit been tried, it would have been the first litigation involving a virtual
property dispute and could have triggered much more virtual property liti-

42. See generally IGE – About Us, http://www.ige.com/about (last visited Oct. 31, 2006) (describing the industry surrounding secondary market transactions in virtual property and the operations of
IGE, Ltd., a profitable business specializing in the purchase and sale of virtual property from MMOGs).
43. See infra Part III.B (discussing the balance between the interests of service providers and users).
44. Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 15, at 39.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 40.
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gation. 47 The Blacksnow case highlights why service providers generally
oppose legal recognition of virtual property interests (e.g., because they
fear losing control of their product and lawsuits from disgruntled users). 48
The case also highlights the recent proliferation of video game sweatshops
(so-called “gold farms”) in poor countries as a highly profitable business
model, a trend with its own disturbing legal and economic consequences. 49
Thus, the economic reality is that virtual property is created, traded,
bought, and sold just like traditional property. Individuals and businesses
have come to rely on this secondary market, and real assets (typically
money) are at stake. If the law fails to protect this value or in some way
guarantee the market, productivity may be lost and destructive practices
(e.g., self-help, hacking, and price-fixing) are likely to emerge.
Furthermore, the secondary market indicium is only one of the five indicia, and thus the absence of this indicium should not preclude the virtual
“thing” at issue from being recognized as virtual property. For example,
email users typically do not buy email accounts from other email users, but
this fact alone should not reduce an email user’s ability to recover a stolen
account. 50 Secondary markets simply serve as supplemental indicia of
virtual property interests.
5. Value-Added-by-Users
The fifth and final indicium is akin to co-authorship, in that multiple
users may assume an ownership interest in a virtual property by customizing and improving the property to reflect their collective creativity. Users
often add value to a remotely hosted computer resource simply by using
the resource, over time, in the manner in which it was intended to be
47. See id. at 72 (foretelling the inevitability of future lawsuits, similar to the Blacksnow case, involving damage occurring to virtual property interests in a secondary market).
48. See infra Part III.B.1 (discussing service providers’ interests).
49. See generally Castronova Posting, supra note 30 (describing the operation and profitability of a
virtual treasure “farm,” with sixteen employees, in the game Everquest, by Sony Online Entertainment). Note, however, that this professional “Gold Farm” eventually went out of business, allegedly
due to competition from professional hackers and cheaters. Id. Thus, the lucrative secondary market
for virtual property has spawned multiple creative (though arguably immoral) businesses that now
directly compete with each other. Paradoxically, some gold farmers scorn such hackers and cheaters
for spoiling the business of farming. Meanwhile, players scorn the gold farmers for spoiling the
game’s virtual economy. Thus, drawing the line between permissible and impermissible conduct may
ultimately hinge on a fact-specific moral judgment, supported by lessons of economic experience and
legal policy.
50. An email account may be “stolen” by someone who learns the password (through hacking or
otherwise) and changes it—a tort akin to conversion. An email account may also be “hijacked” by
someone who learns the password and uses the account to send unauthorized mail, usually spam—a
tort akin to trespass. See generally infra Part III.B.1 (discussing why service providers might not
intervene in these circumstances, leaving users with redress only through self-help or legal action).
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used. 51 Such value-added-by-user should be distinguished, however, from
the Lockean theory of property through labor. 52 Contributing to the value
of an intangible resource should not automatically entitle the contributor to
a property interest in the resource—just as spraying graffiti on a building
should not automatically entitle the graffiti artist to a property interest in
the building. Rather, where the nature of an interest in an intangible resource is such that it should qualify for legal protection, there is a high
likelihood that the user has, at some point, added value to the resource.
Simply put, a person is likely to improve and customize property that he
believes belongs exclusively to himself, and, by recognizing and encouraging this activity, the law of property ultimately benefits all people. 53 Thus,
value-added-by-user indicates, rather than creates, protectable virtual property interests.
A MMOG user account is the quintessence of value-added-by-user.
The MMOG service provider’s business model presumes that players will
add value to the account, thereby becoming personally invested in, or addicted to, the game. 54 The initial retail (or “first sale”) value of a MMOG
user account lies entirely in the value of having a “clean slate” from which
to build an online identity. 55 Players build online identities by interacting
with other players, by acquiring virtual treasure, and by advancing through
various stages of the game. This process never ends—every hour spent
online affects the value of a player’s online identity. 56 The game begins to

51. See Weber, supra note 7, at 191 (“[Virtual Reality] insiders agree that with this technology, the
user becomes a co-creator of his or her experience”); Wu, supra note 25, at 175-76 (noting that software programmers and users may be co-authors of works created using computer programs).
52. See generally Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 15, at 46-47 (applying John Locke’s theory of
property through labor as a supplemental justification for recognizing virtual property interests).
53. Cf. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The economic philosophy behind . . . patents and
copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to
advance public welfare.”). In the context of virtual property, it is easy to imagine how encouraging
users to add value to remote resources will promote creativity and growth of the Internet, thereby
benefiting society, despite the exclusive nature of property protections. In fact, the appeal of certain
services depends entirely on the contributions of the users. See, e.g., What is Second Life?,
http://secondlife.com/whatis/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2006) (“Second Life is a 3-D virtual world entirely
built and owned by its residents.”).
54. See generally NICHOLAS YEE, ARIADNE - UNDERSTANDING MMORPG ADDICTION (2002),
http://www.nickyee.com/hub/addiction/addiction.pdf (discussing the design elements of MMOGs
which cultivate addictive behavior in players).
55. Being the first purchaser also provides added security by allowing the purchaser to create an
anonymous account name (distinct from the publicly visible character name) and to set the first password. The pervasive secondary market for MMOG accounts, however, indicates that the firstpurchaser-security premium is relatively small. Moreover, it is assumed that a reasonably prudent
secondary purchaser will immediately change the password to the account.
56. Castronova, supra note 3, at 14 (“The result of all this effort, which can take hundreds of hours,
is ‘avatar capital’: an enhancement of the avatar's capabilities through training.”).
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resemble a job, with some players spending more than eighty hours per
week improving their virtual characters. 57
Although some may suggest that this investment of time and effort
warrants equitable protection (the Lockean theory of property through labor), 58 players probably would not invest such time and effort if they did
not expect equitable protection from the beginning. The legal justification
for protecting the players’ property interest arises not from the hundreds of
hours that they spend online but from the sense of ownership, security,
utility, and value that encourages them to spend those hundreds of hours
online. 59 Moreover, the amount of time and effort that a player dedicates
to an online identity is strong evidence of protectable virtual property lurking somewhere within the online identity, and courts should use this evidence, if available, when quantifying the property interests at stake. Time
and effort alone, however, do not give rise to virtual property. Rather, the
inherent nature of a MMOG user account, rather than users’ labor, creates
a protectable virtual property interest, which may be evidenced by the
other four indicia of virtual property—namely rivalry, persistence, interconnectivity, and secondary markets.
B. Combining the Indicia to Identify Virtual Property
Because technology—particularly Internet technology—continues to
evolve at a rapid pace, it is impossible to identify, prospectively, all possible forms of virtual property. Therefore, for the five indicia to be practical,
they must be applied flexibly. Potential property interests should be evaluated for not only the presence or absence of each indicium, but also for the
degree to which each indicium is present or absent. For example, as discussed above, different web-based user accounts may exhibit varying degrees of interconnectivity. Likewise, an interactive resource may be semirivalrous, in that a limited number of users may be able to use the resource
simultaneously. Consequently, each set of circumstances should be considered in light of the aggregate indicia supporting or countering the case
for a potential property interest. No single factor should be dispositive.

57. Id. at 36; see also Dibbell, supra note 30 (describing how carpenter Troy Stolle would come
home from work every day to immediately resume his second “job” as a virtual blacksmith in Ultima
Online).
58. See Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 15, at 46-47 (applying John Locke’s theory of property
through labor to virtual property). Note, however, that Lastowka and Hunter only cite Lockean theories as a “fitting, or perhaps amusing” supplement to other, more contemporary, rationales for recognizing virtual property interests. Id.
59. Players’ sense of ownership, security, utility, and value may arise from the property’s characteristics of rivalry, persistence, interconnectivity, and secondary market value, respectively.
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Significantly, a service provider’s characterization of its own content
should have little or no legal effect. A disclaimer stating “This is not virtual property” should never be determinative; just as a disclaimer stating
“This is not a security” cannot magically change the nature of company
stock. 60 Form should be disregarded for substance and the emphasis
should be on economic reality. 61
As a result, service providers who perceive a threat in the legal recognition of virtual property and who deliberately seek to usurp users’ virtual
property interests through EULAs may still fail to secure their own interests, because the economic reality of virtual property may trump empty
formalities in an EULA. 62 Therefore, when balancing the interests of service providers with the interests of users, courts should recognize the fact
that service providers may be unable to limit the virtual property interests
created by their services. Part III.B further discusses this balancing.
Considering all five indicia, virtual property may take many different
forms, but some forms are more prevalent than others. Online accounts,
such as email and bank accounts, are a familiar form of virtual property. 63
Personalized “web-spaces,” such as amateur homepages and professional
websites, usually exhibit the indicia of virtual property. 64 Automated bidding agents, moderated chat rooms, advertising space, and many other
common Internet entities might also qualify. Finally, and perhaps most
significantly to millions of Internet game players, virtual avatars and the
treasures they carry in MMOGs fall naturally within the definition of virtual property. 65

60. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) (noting that, in securities law, substance
trumps form); cf. Wood v. Shell Oil Co., 495 So. 2d 1034, 1037 (Ala. 1986) (noting that an explicit
disclaimer may still fail to negate an agency relationship when independent evidence suggests a retained right of control—i.e., substance trumps form).
61. Tcherepnin, 389 U.S. at 336 (referring to securities); see also infra Part III.B.2 (discussing
problematic language often employed by users to disguise the economic reality behind transactions in
virtual property).
62. See infra Part III.B (discussing common terms in EULAs). But cf. Ian MacInnes, The Implications of Property Rights in Virtual Worlds, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TENTH AMERICAS CONFERENCE ON
INFORMATION SYSTEMS 2727, 2730 (2004), available at http://e-business.fhbb.ch/eb/publications.nsf/
bb366c7c939905e1c1256c5600643476/b1013216f68a694ac1256f100027a530/$FILE/SIGEBZ05-1668
.pdf (arguing that “[t]he legal system may be forgiving [to game developers] in cases . . . where the
developer acted to shut down trade in game items”).
63. Fairfield, supra note 6, at 1055, 1057.
64. Id. at 1056-57.
65. This is largely due to the fact that MMOG providers intentionally design the game code to
simulate real world land and chattel. See Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 15, at 30 (“Central to the
operation of most modern virtual worlds is a property system, with . . . familiar real-world features.”).
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III. BALANCING VIRTUAL PROPERTY INTERESTS
A. Relationships—The Difference Between User-to-Service Provider and
User-to-User
Once a court identifies a potential virtual property interest, it should
analyze the relationships involved, to better understand the implications of
that interest. Typically, at least two different relationships are involved,
each with its own implications. The user engages in a contractual relationship with the service provider and simultaneously may engage in a social
and business relationship with other users. Analogizing these relationships
to commonly understood legal structures will help the court balance the
interests of the parties for the purpose of evaluating the property rights
involved. 66
The relationship between the user and service provider can be analogized to the legal structure of the licensor-licensee relationship. Usually,
online service providers make large initial investments in computer hardware, software, and intellectual property to establish a community or webspace with long-term growth potential. 67 Service providers then license
access to these expensive resources to users. Users manipulate, interact
with, and develop these resources according to certain rules set by the service provider, as would a licensee acting within the bounds of a license.
For example, Yahoo! Mail provides email users with one gigabyte of
data storage space, a unique email address, a customizable email management and filing system, a spam filter, and a virus scanner—with all the
relevant code executing on Yahoo! Inc.’s computers, rather than on the
user’s computer—for free. 68 This relationship between Yahoo! and its
users could be characterized as “licensed access to resources.” Additionally, among other profitable endeavors, Yahoo! recoups its initial investment by selling high-value advertising space targeted to individual user
profiles. Such precisely targeted exposure is extremely valuable to advertisers, who may develop legitimate virtual property interests in their assigned advertising space. 69 Thus, email accounts are not the only re66. See infra Part III.B (discussing the balance between the interests of service providers and users).
67. See MacInnes, supra note 62, at 2729 (noting that in the early stages of development, service
providers should focus on technical issues such as security and reliability).
68. See generally Yahoo! Help – Yahoo! Mail, http://help.yahoo.com/help/us/mail/ (last visited on
Oct. 31, 2006) (providing a detailed overview of the features of Yahoo! Mail). Of course, Yahoo! users
must agree to a lengthy Terms of Service agreement.
See Yahoo! Terms of Service,
http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/ (last visited on Oct. 31, 2006) (listing Yahoo! Inc.’s twenty-six terms
of service).
69. Consider such advertising space in light of the five proposed indicia: (1) subject to the terms of
their agreement with Yahoo!, advertisers generally exclude outsiders from exercising control over the
content of their advertisements (rivalry); (2) advertisers reasonably expect the advertisements to endure
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sources licensed by Yahoo!, and email users are not Yahoo!’s only licensees.
As another example, MMOGs also use a form of the centralized “licensed access to resources” model. Although a player may purchase and
install software on a personal computer to play a game, the player’s virtual
property is entirely stored on the service provider’s computers. Players
may access their personal avatars and treasures from any computer capable
of running the interface software. By licensing access to remotely hosted
resources, players derive many benefits. For example, the service provider
can implement better security measures to prevent hackers from tampering
with the data and can guarantee superior data integrity through redundant
backups. 70
Note that the retail software CD, the host computers, and the virtual
property may all belong to different parties and the system can still function perfectly. 71 This fact further illustrates the distinction between virtual
property and traditional property and should comfort service providers who
fear that recognizing virtual property interests will somehow deprive them
of control over the host computers. 72 Simply put, by recognizing an interest in virtual property, service providers do not give up ownership and control of any computers storing the virtual property. 73
and to appear repeatedly on Yahoo! for the complete term of their contract (persistence); (3) advertisers
include “hot-links” in their advertisements, allowing Yahoo! patrons to interact with the advertisements
and directing patrons to the advertisers’ websites (interconnectivity); (4) advertisers sometimes cooperate to share the cost of a single ad-space (a form of secondary market); and (5) the value of the advertising space usually derives from its prominence, frequency of appearance, and placement on Yahoo!’s
web pages (facets generally determined by Yahoo! as the service provider, rather than by the advertisers as users—thereby lacking value-added-by-user). Advertising space on Yahoo! thus exhibits four of
the five indicia proposed herein, tipping the balance in favor of an enforceable virtual property interest.
70. As noted by Professor Fairfield, MMOGs achieve the indicia of persistence as a result of this
distributed computing model. Fairfield, supra note 6, at 1054 n.26. Thus, some of the most desirable
features sought by users of remotely hosted computer resources are exactly the features that create a
virtual property interest.
71. Although, to promote the primary market for profitable software CDs, providers often require
the user to have the CD in order to access the virtual property. In contrast, some game developers
deliberately forego such tie-ins. See generally SUNEEL RATAN, PLEASE, MORE STEAM-POWERED
GAMES (2004), http://www.wired.com/news/games/0,2101,65758,00.html (discussing broadband
software distribution, where users download software from the Internet rather than buying CDs in a
store).
72. See Fairfield, supra note 6, at 1077-78, 1097-99 (explaining the distinction between virtual
property and the computers it may be stored on; outlining and rebutting the “control” argument put
forth by service providers).
73. See infra Part III.B (discussing the balance between the interests of service providers and users).
If a court were to hold that the virtual property interests of users restricts the freedom of service providers to control their own computers, this would be an undue and unwise extension of virtual property
law, as these interests can coexist without interference, if properly defined and balanced. But see
Fairfield, supra note 6, at 1098-99 (suggesting that the chattel property interests of service providers
may be affected by users’ virtual property interests, but that such effects may be mitigated by compromise and contractual agreements).
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The “licensed access to resources” model common to virtual property
relationships thus resembles the relationship between a licensor and a licensee of traditional property. The licensor ostensibly owns the licensed
property, but the licensee exercises exclusive control over the property for
a limited time, within limits set by a license agreement. In the virtual
property context, the user is “borrowing” a relatively small fraction of the
service provider’s large initial investment. Given that the provider hosts
the service at large initial expense and that many people benefit from the
service, according deference to the providers’ interests is in the public interest.
In contrast, relationships between users may take any number of forms,
depending on the facts of each case. For example, some virtual worlds
allow users to buy, sell, and trade virtual “land” upon which the users may
build virtual homes, meeting halls, storefronts, towers, or castles. Unsurprisingly, two users with adjacent plots of “land” could be characterized as
neighbors, and legal principles applied in disputes between real-world
neighbors (such as trespass, nuisance, or even adverse possession) could, at
the very least, add familiar context to a virtual dispute. Assuming courts
first find a protectable virtual property interest, real-world precedent could
be applied by analogy to help resolve disputes between users. The analogy
most appropriate to a given case could help determine, in turn, whether the
court should give deference to any party through, e.g., assignment of burdens of proof.
Thus, virtual property disputes between multiple users differ from disputes between a user and a service provider, because the latter dispute implicates inherent equitable and policy concerns that favor the service provider. The licensor-licensee analogy aptly frames the user-to-service provider relationship. The user-to-user relationship, however, may vary in
every case. Therefore, resolving a dispute between users may require a
more detailed analysis of individual property interests, including the interests of the service provider—likely an affected party.
B. The Parties’ Interests
1. Service Providers’ Interests
Internet service providers react with understandable negativity toward
the recognition of legally enforceable virtual property interests. 74 Con74. See, e.g., Richard A. Bartle, Virtual Worldliness: What the Imaginary Asks of the Real, 1 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 19, 37 (2004-2005) (arguing, inter alia, that recognizing users’ virtual property interests
would undermine service providers’ ability to control the quality of the service). Note that “Dr. Bartle
is one of the fathers of modern virtual worlds, having designed the early text-based virtual environ-
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versely, users tend to embrace the concept. 75 Superficially, granting a new
property interest to users appears to carve a chunk of rights out of the service providers’ intellectual property. Because the development of massively multi-user Internet-based services often involves a large, risky initial
investment in equipment, capital, software, and intellectual property, to be
recouped gradually over time, service providers are understandably unwilling to abandon any assets of value, intangible or otherwise. 76 Consequently, service providers may see an interest in capturing the value of
virtual property by preserving the legal status quo, although lawsuits loom
imminently and obviously on the horizon, poised ready to test (and probably unsettle) this area of law. 77 In addition, some service providers fear
that recognizing virtual property will expose them to additional liability,
thereby restricting their ability to control the quality of their service and
generally dampening the incentive for Internet businesses to innovate and
improve. 78 Given the notoriously fickle nature and rapidly shifting loyalties of Internet consumers, 79 quality control and continuing improvement
are integral components of the business model for the vast majority of
online content providers. 80 Finally, service providers need legal stability
and certainty to design effective services and to craft enforceable contracts.

ments.” Fairfield, supra note 6, at 1097 n.253. See also, e.g., What Exactly is the EUALA? What
Does it Say? Dark Age of Camelot (TM) End User Access and License Agreement,
http://support.darkageofcamelot.com/ kb/article.php?id=072, § 2(A) (last visited Oct. 31, 2006) [hereinafter Dark Age of Camelot EUALA] (explicitly contracting with users to disclaim or assign virtual
property interests in their accounts in exchange for access to the service).
75. See generally Fairfield, supra note 6 (advocating for the legal recognition of virtual property
interests).
76. See MacInnes, supra note 62, at 21-29 (outlining the concerns of a virtual-world service provider during the developmental stages of the business).
77. See Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 15, at 72 (suggesting that virtual property lawsuits, similar
to the Blacksnow case, are imminent and inevitable).
78. Bartle, supra note 74, at 37; MacInnes, supra note 62, at 2731-32 (describing the “control paradox” faced by MMOG developers); see Fairfield, supra note 6, at 1097-99 (raising and refuting these
objections to virtual property commonly raised by service providers).
79. A single mistake by a service provider may destroy all public goodwill and ruin an Internet
business. As a famous example, shortly after the highly publicized 2003 release of the MMOG Shadowbane, by Ubi Soft and Wolfpack Studios, the game was briefly (but very publicly) hacked. Although no permanent damage resulted, many players lost confidence in the game’s security and programming integrity. See, e.g., Shadowbane Hacked, Game Over, http://www.gamerifts.com/cgibin/newspro/ fullnews.cgi?newsid1054080000,36908 (last visited Oct. 31, 2006) (“I was one of the
most vocal defenders of all Shadowbane stood for . . . . But at some point, enough is enough. I’ve had
enough. . . . if you still have an account, you are an idiot.”). Relative to the competition, Shadowbane
became a phenomenal flop and failed to generate a profit. See BRUCE WOODCOCK, AN ANALYSIS OF
MMOG SUBSCRIPTION GROWTH, http://www.mmogchart.com/Analysis.html (last visited Oct. 31,
2006) (citing MMOG subscription statistics indicating that Shadowbane failed to generate a profit).
80. All MMOG providers constantly improve their services by creating “patches” to add new content and to fix design flaws. Users not only accept this frequent “patching,” they expect it as part of the
service.
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Thus, maintaining the legal status quo would serve multiple interests of
service providers.
Service providers also have an interest in disputes between users being
resolved in an agreeable and orderly manner with minimal intervention
from the service providers themselves. To begin with, service providers
have no legal obligation to mediate disputes between users arising out of
the service. Many online content providers have deliberately chosen not to
involve themselves in such disputes, even if the dispute concerns a question of account access. 81 Although such a practice eliminates a potential
avenue of redress for a user who has been defrauded by a scammer, 82
thereby potentially producing unhappy customers and inviting fraudulent
behavior, the prospect of becoming mired in the unpredictable, uncontrollable details of user interactions, both inside and outside the virtual environment, seems even more onerous. For example, as an international virtual market for substantial volumes of property, eBay.com spends significant resources and struggles continuously to find a profitable balance between a laissez-faire “hands-off” approach and strict regulation. 83
Moreover, open involvement in dispute resolution by the service provider invites scammers to manipulate the providers’ policies and rules to
use the provider as an accessory to fraud. To some service providers, “if
you build a better mousetrap, the mouse will just get smarter.” Such policies reflect a business decision to avoid involvement in litigation between
users. Acknowledging that disputes between users are inevitable, it is in
the service providers’ interest for such disputes to be resolved in an agreeable, fair, and efficient manner, whether by operation of law, contract, or
business practice, or by the intervention of some third party. Therefore,
service providers would benefit from the legal recognition of virtual property, assuming such recognition gave users an avenue of redress from the
actions of other users.
Thus, in the perpetual effort to profit and grow, service providers generally seek the freedom to make the business decisions necessary to maximize user loyalty through a combination of innovation and quality control.
81. See, e.g., Dark Age of Camelot EUALA, supra note 74, § 1(D) (“You are responsible for . . . any
damage, harm, lost or deleted characters, etc. resulting from . . . use by any person of your Passwords
to gain access to your Account. IN NO EVENT SHALL MYTHIC ENTERTAINMENT BE HELD
RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY DAMAGE THAT OCCURS TO YOUR ACCOUNT, YOUR
CHARACTERS OR THEIR POSSESSIONS IN THE EVENT YOUR PASSWORDS ARE
DISCLOSED . . . .”).
82. Unquestionably, in some situations, the service provider may be the only party in a position to
remedy a fraud.
83. See generally, e.g., eBay Security Center: Rules & Policies, http://pages.ebay.com/
securitycenter/ rules_policies.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2006) (providing access to numerous webpages
detailing eBay’s fraud prevention and dispute resolution policies).
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Although some providers’ policies (such as a “hands-off” dispute resolution policy) may seem to inhibit users’ virtual property interests, no service
provider (which intends to succeed) is genuinely interested in sabotaging
the legal rights of its customers. Therefore, while none of the service providers’ interests should entirely negate the legal enforceability of users’
virtual property interests, these interests and practical business concerns
are certainly legitimate, and they should be acknowledged whenever any
court adjudicates a virtual property dispute.
2. Users’ Interests
At first blush, the interests of those who routinely use virtual property
would seem to be in direct tension with the interests of service providers.
Users, however, have several legitimate interests that do not conflict with
the interests of service providers. Moreover, the apparent conflict between
users’ and service providers’ interests arises from the misconception that
recognizing virtual property would somehow divide and redistribute service providers’ valuable traditional property.
The misconception arises when users view overturning the legal status
quo as akin to the government endorsing a currently underground form of
currency, thereby ascribing monetary value to nothingness solely to the
users’ benefit. For example, if tomorrow the government began accepting
virtual platinum coins from Everquest (a popular MMOG) as an alternative
means of collecting income taxes, certainly very few players would object,
as this would be a substantial windfall. 84 Thus, given the intangible nature
of virtual property, proponents may become hopelessly tangled in the romantic prospect of creating something from nothing. Under this illusion,
the Internet becomes a new Wild West, with a seemingly unlimited expanse of frontier property ripe for the taking. 85 This reasoning then becomes the target of criticism. 86 The legal reality, however, is not so simple.
Users have legitimate interests beyond the simple desire to amass
property in all its forms. The most apparent and commonly cited interest
84. Disregarding, for the moment, the obvious negative long-term side-effects this would have on
the national and Everquest economies.
85. See, e.g., Shamoil Shipchandler, Note, The Wild Wild Web: Nonregulation as the Answer to the
Regulatory Question, 33 CORNELL INTL. L.J. 435, 436 (2000) (“Today’s Wild West is the Internet.”).
86. See Hunter, supra note 29, at 513 (challenging the “cyberspace as place” metaphor as leading to
a tragedy of the anticommons, wherein competing exclusionary rights lead to suboptimal overall utilization); Alfred C. Yen, Western Frontier or Feudal Society?: Metaphors and Perceptions of Cyberspace, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1207, 1232, 1240, 1247-48 (2002) (rejecting the Western Frontier
analogy as misleading and overly optimistic and suggesting, instead, that the Internet is more like a
feudal society of “cyberlords” and “cyberserfs”).

2006

THE FIVE INDICIA OF VIRTUAL PROPERTY

157

for players of MMOGs is in the value of time. 87 The addictive nature of
MMOGs causes players to spend tremendous amounts of time developing
their avatars online. 88 For the average player seeking to accomplish the
game’s objectives, each hour spent online usually translates into an incremental increase in the avatar’s secondary market value. 89 For example, in
2001, economist Edward Castronova calculated the average “hourly wage”
earned by Everquest players as $3.42 per hour spent online. 90 Notably, for
a minority of Everquest players (those who spend over eighty hours per
week online), this “wage” would place them above the poverty line. 91
However, time commitment alone does not create value per se.
Illustratively, when a buyer on a secondary market purchases a
MMOG account, he generally does not care how much time was spent
developing the account; rather, the buyer cares about the amount of virtual
treasure accumulated by the seller and stored on the account. Literally, the
buyer pays for a Level 50 Warrior with a full set of Oceanic armor, and it
is disingenuous to suggest that the buyer is “employing” the seller, retrospectively, at a rate of $3.42 per hour, to spend the 100 hours necessary to
develop a Warrior to Level 50 and to acquire a full set of Oceanic armor. 92
The “employment” analogy, however, is gaining popularity as a technical
argument developed to circumvent clauses in some MMOG End User License Agreements that restrict the resale of virtual property. 93 For example, some listings on eBay.com contain language similar to:

87. See Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 15, at 39-40 (presenting the arguments raised by counsel to
Blacksnow Interactive, in Blacksnow Interactive v. Mythic Entertainment (case later dropped), which,
inter alia, asserted that players have an equitable interest in the value of their time spent online); see
also Castronova, supra note 3, at 14 (“developing the avatar’s skills takes time . . . all this effort . . . can
take hundreds of hours.”).
88. See Dibbell, supra note 30 (describing how carpenter Troy Stolle would come home from work
every day immediately to resume his second “job” as a virtual blacksmith in Ultima Online); see generally YEE, supra note 54 (discussing the design elements of MMOGs which cultivate addictive behavior in players).
89. See supra Part II.A.5 (discussing value-added-by-user as an indicia of virtual property and citing
MMOG accounts as the quintessential example); see also Castronova, supra note 3 (calculating the
average resultant increase in the secondary market value of an Everquest player’s account per hour
spent online).
90. Castronova, supra note 3, at 35. This “wage,” however, was not paid as U.S. dollars but was
reflected by the account’s increased secondary market value.
91. Id. at 36.
92. Evidence suggests that the average player spends much more than 100 hours developing a
MMOG character. See generally YEE, supra note 54 (charting and analyzing addictive behaviors
demonstrated by many who play MMOGs).
93. For some companies, the analogy is reality. Players may prospectively hire hourly services,
such as those offered by Topgameseller.com, to develop their characters—in contrast to the retrospective “services” offered by players who sell their accounts. See Topgameseller.com Frequently Asked
Questions, http://www.topgameseller.com/faq.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2006) (describing the business
and services offered by Topgameseller.com—for example: “We assign 2 or 3 expert players to your
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Disclaimer: You are bidding on my time leveling for this account. Said
account remains the property of Blizzard [Entertainment]. You will not
‘OWN’ the account, for it belongs to Blizzard. The only thing you are bidding on is the time I have invested into the account. All characters, items,
in-game currency, and anything else associated with this auction will remain the property of Blizzard. 94
Such language raises three unresolved issues: (1) whether the eBay
buyer would be able to enforce the contract against the seller; 95 (2) whether
such language successfully evades EULA restrictions; 96 and most importantly (3) whether the relevant typical MMOG EULA restrictions themselves are legally enforceable. 97 At first blush, the MMOG secondary
market appears to value only the virtual property itself and not the player’s
underlying time commitment. However, the secondary market value of the
virtual treasure, in turn, correlates strongly with the amount of time necessary to acquire the treasure. All parties concerned may be well aware of
the 100 hours of playtime typically required to develop the illustrative
Level 50 Warrior with Oceanic armor. Thus, the buyer is spending
$342.00 to save himself 100 hours of tedious character development. The
enforceability of a contract selling access to the Warrior should not hinge
on a tedious distinction between prospective and retrospective labor. If
anything, the unresolved issues surrounding secondary market exchanges
of virtual property demonstrate one of the users’ strongest interests: the
interest in legal certainty. This is not the only interest shared by both users
and service providers.

character to do the leveling . . . . We have extensive knowledge of your game’s world and know the
best areas & quests to level your character as fast as possible.”).
94. This disclaimer was compiled from a variety of eBay listings containing similar language.
95. Depending on the level of legal abstraction, whether “time leveling for this account” constitutes
consideration becomes an interesting question. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§§ 71, 86 (1981) (generally reciting the requirement of consideration in contract law and addressing
issues raised by promises made in recognition of past performance). Once again, prudence should
dictate a practical approach—looking to the actual effect of the contract rather than its deliberately
slippery language. “[F]orm should be disregarded for substance and the emphasis should be on economic reality.” Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) (referring to securities). In economic
reality, virtual property is changing hands.
96. See Dark Age of Camelot EUALA, supra note 74, § 2(A) (“YOU SPECIFICALLY
ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE TIME YOU SPEND PLAYING DARK AGE OF CAMELOT(TM) IS
FOR ENTERTAINMENT PURPOSES ONLY, AND THAT YOU CLAIM NO INTEREST IN THE
VALUE OF SUCH TIME.”).
97. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 186 (1981) (reciting principle that a
promise may be unenforceable on grounds of public policy if it constitutes an unreasonable restraint of
trade, i.e., limiting competition in any business); Grierson, supra note 2 (collecting discussion and case
law relating to software licenses but not specifically pertaining to virtual property).
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3. Shared Interests
In many respects, users and service providers share similar interests
that may be reconciled with minimal tension. Users benefit when service
providers experiment, innovate, and improve their services. Thus, users
directly share the service providers’ interest in the orderly resolution of
disputes without requiring service providers’ involvement. Users also
share the service providers’ interest in protecting the large, requisite investment in hardware, software, and intellectual property, because, as mentioned above, this promotes development. 98 The social and macroeconomic value of a dynamic and rapidly growing Internet cannot be overestimated. As the automobile revolutionized the twentieth century, the Internet (and virtual environments in particular) will drive world industry in
new directions for generations to come. Therefore, as a policy matter, all
people share the service providers’ interest in maintaining the freedom to
innovate and to control the quality of online services.
On a more immediate and practical level, service providers share users’ interest in preserving the value of virtual property through transactions
in secondary markets, subject to some qualifications. Logically, the most
highly developed user accounts are also the most valuable. 99 Likewise,
users with highly developed accounts are more likely to contribute actively
to the service provider’s popularity and profitability—whether through a
sense of irreversible commitment (i.e., addiction) or earnest goodwill.
Thus, when one user decides to conclude his relationship with a service
provider, the remaining users and the service provider share a business
interest in preserving the value of the departing user’s account.
Lastly, both service providers and users share a generalized interest in
the reduction or prevention of disputes and in resolving such disputes fairly
and efficiently. Here, again, as in many other areas of law, simply deciding the issue one way or another would promote development by eliminating uncertainty. 100 At the very least, lawmaking action (if carefully under98. See supra Part III.B.1 (discussing service providers’ interest in retaining enforceable rights as a
means of recouping initial investment).
99. See Dibbell, supra note 30 (discussing the disposition of Troy Stolle’s account, in the MMOG
Ultima Online, which, after fifty-two weeks of development, was worth $1500 to $2000).
100. Although the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA), promulgated in 2000
by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws but only adopted (as of March,
2006) in Maryland and Virginia, addresses the enforceability of click-wrap licenses and other Internet
transactions, none of its sections deal explicitly with virtual property, and none of UCITA’s comments
or legislative history address the subject. See, e.g., UNIF. COMPUTER INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT §§
112, 114, 210 (amended 2002) (sections affecting the enforceability of click-wrap licenses); see Grierson, supra note 2, at § 2[b] (briefly discussing the effect of UCITA on the enforceability of click-wrap
licenses). Note, also, that some states have enacted so-called “bomb shelter” laws that render choice of
law clauses in contracts unenforceable against residents of those states to the extent that the contract
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taken) could allow online service providers to draft simpler End User License Agreements, which, in turn, would be more likely to be understood
by the average licensee of virtual property. This would benefit both service providers and users by establishing, finally, the limits of the users’
enforceable property rights.
C. Striking a Balance
Users and service providers should squarely confront the merits of virtual property issues as such. Tiptoeing around the concept of virtual property by resorting to semantic technicalities only adds uncertainty, thereby
hampering the development of secondary markets and other economically
valuable satellite industries. 101 All parties involved need to know exactly
which contracts involving virtual property are enforceable and which ones
are not.
Therefore, courts and legislatures should openly discuss the implications of virtual property and recognize the distinction between the two
types of disputes that could potentially arise. Between a user and a service
provider, the overall balance must tip in favor of the service provider, in
the interest of promoting innovation and quality control (and in recognition
of the practical realities of the marketplace). Between the user and another
user, however, public policy demands stronger, more clearly defined, and
enforceable virtual property interests. Moreover, the provisions of a license agreement governing the relationship between a user and a service
provider should not unduly intrude into a legal dispute between two users. 102 Likewise, in adjudicating disputes between users, courts must tread
carefully to avoid creating law that would unduly hinder the freedom and
legitimate interests of service providers—for example, by affecting the
service providers’ ability to control their real world chattels.

calls for application of the law of a state that has enacted UCITA. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-329
(2005) (North Carolina “bomb-shelter”); Grierson, supra note 2, § 2[b]. Moreover, UCITA has not
received a warm welcome. E.g., Jason Krause, SEE YA, UCITA: Uniform Law on Software Sales
Never Got Traction with ABA, 89 A.B.A. J. 20 (2003) (“[UCITA’s] recent failure to earn ABA approval effectively destroyed its future.”). Thus, the only potentially relevant lawmaking action (in this
case by state legislatures) has failed to gain momentum due to perceived inherent flaws. Whether the
next step should come from a legislature or a court remains to be determined.
101. See supra Part III.B.2 (reciting problematic language typically employed by users who sell
virtual property on eBay.com in an effort to disguise a sale of virtual property).
102. In an effort to protect themselves from litigation raising the virtual property premise, service
providers often include clauses in EULAs forcing users to disclaim all property interests in their accounts. Such an EULA could be used to moot a dispute between two users, e.g., by voiding a secondary market transaction, thereby undermining any discussion of the merits of the case. This would be
one example of the provisions of a license agreement governing the relationship between a user and a
service provider unduly intruding into a legal dispute between two users.
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IV. CONCLUSION
When faced with a potential virtual property dispute, courts should apply a three-step analysis: (1) using the five indicia of virtual property (rivalry, persistence, interconnectivity, secondary markets, and value-addedby-users), identify and delineate the virtual property at issue; (2) identify
the interests of the parties affected, either through analogy to a pre-existing
legal relationship (such as the licensor-licensee relationship) or through
specific fact-finding relevant to the industry at hand; and (3) balance those
interests to reach an equitable solution, with particular attention to preserving the freedom and flexibility of service providers.
The development of multi-million-dollar secondary markets based entirely on the exchange of virtual property reflects the fringes of a nascent
international industry, which, if properly cultivated, could yield enormous
future economic and social value. The time has come to recognize virtual
property in the courtroom, at least in disputes between users, in order to
encourage secondary market trades and innovative business models. Furthermore, as the door swings open to reveal this new frontier, we must
always remember the legitimate property interests of the creators and innovators—the service providers—without whom this frontier would not exist.

